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Abstract
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology
and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an
equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in terms of best reply dynamics,
in which each player myopically uses the best response to her opponent’s last move. Existing
research shows that convergence can be problematic when there are best reply cycles. Here
we calculate how typical this is by studying the space of all possible two-player normal
form games and counting the frequency of best reply cycles. The two key parameters are
the number of moves, which defines how complicated the game is, and the anti-correlation
of the payoffs, which determines how competitive it is. We find that as games get more
complicated and more competitive, best reply cycles become dominant. The existence of
best reply cycles predicts non-convergence of six different learning algorithms that have
support from human experiments. Our results imply that for complicated and competitive
games equilibrium is typically an unrealistic assumption. Alternatively, if for some reason
“real” games are special and do not possess cycles, we raise the interesting question of why
this should be so.
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Cycles and feedback loops are common
sources of instability in natural and social sys-
tems. Here we investigate the relation between
cycles and instability in generic settings that
can be modeled as two-player games. These in-
clude strategic interactions between individual
players [1], evolutionary processes [2], social
phenomena such as the emergence of coopera-
tion [3] and language formation [4], congestion
on roads and on the internet [5] and many other
applications. We introduce a formalism—that
we call best reply structure—to characterize in-
stability in terms of an approximated represen-
tation of the game, in a similar spirit to the
seminal contributions by Kauffman and May
on gene regulation [6] and ecosystem stability
[7].
In game theory instability can be under-
stood as the failure of strategies to converge to
a fixed point, such as a Nash equilibrium, as a
game is played repeatedly [8]. It is well-known
that convergence is likely to fail in games such
as Matching Pennies or Rock Paper Scissors
[9, 10, 11], in which the best replies of the game
form a cycle (in a sense that will be clarified
below). Very general convergence results have
been proven for various types of acyclic games
[12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. But how typical are acyclic
games? Do acyclic games span the space of
games that are likely to be encountered in re-
alistic settings? Or are they special?
Here we systematically study this problem
for all possible two-player normal form games.
We characterize classes of games in terms of an
ensemble in which we construct the payoff ma-
trices at random and then hold them fixed as
the game is played. Our formalism predicts the
typical frequency of convergence as the param-
eters of the ensemble are varied. We show that
best reply cycles become likely and conver-
gence typically fails as games become (i) more
complicated, in the sense that the number of
moves per player is large, and (ii) more com-
petitive, in the sense that the payoffs to the two
players for any given combination of moves are
anti-correlated. For example, with 10 moves
per player and correlation -0.7, acyclic games
make up only 2.7% of the total. As a conse-
quence, in generic complicated and competitive
games equilibrium convergence is typically an
unrealistic assumption.
While studying the generic properties of an
ensemble of systems is a common approach in
the natural sciences, it is unusual in game the-
ory. Therefore, before describing our contri-
bution and the relation with the literature in
more detail, we clarify why we consider this
approach useful for game theory.
A natural point of comparison is the work
in theoretical ecology by Robert May [17],
who used an ensemble of randomly generated
predator-prey interactions as a null model of
a generic ecosystem, and showed that large
ecosystems tend to be unstable. Real ecosys-
tems are not random, rather they are shaped
by evolutionary selection and other forces.
Many real ecosystems have also existed for
long periods of time, suggesting they are in
fact stable. This indicated that real ecosys-
tems are not typical members of the ensemble,
and raised the important question of precisely
how they are atypical and why they are stable.
Forty five years later, this remains a subject of
active research.
Here we apply the same approach to game
theory, taking an ensemble of random games as
a null model for real-world scenarios that can
be represented as games. Pricing in oligopolis-
tic markets, innovation strategies in compet-
ing firms, buying and selling in financial mar-
kets, auctions, electoral strategies in competing
parties, traffic on roads and sending packets
through the internet are all examples of com-
plicated and competitive games. In contrast
to ecology, from an empirical point of view it
is not clear a priori whether they are stable:
When is equilibrium a good behavioral model?
The rules of these games are designed and not
random, but insofar as they can be modeled
by normal form games, they are all members
of the ensemble we study here. If complicated
and competitive real games are typical mem-
bers of their ensemble, our results indicate that
equilibrium is likely a poor approximation.
Alternatively, if human-designed games are
atypical and cycles are rare, why is this so?
This may vary case by case, but if human-
designed games tend to be atypical, our strate-
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gic conflicts must have special properties.
Whether this is true, and why human design
might cause atypical behavior, is far from ob-
vious. If human-designed games are atypical,
then why this is so is an interesting question
that deserves further study.
To better understand our formalism, con-
sider one of the simplest learning algorithms,
best reply dynamics. Under this algorithm
each player myopically responds with the best
reply to her opponent’s last move. The
best reply dynamics converges to attractors
that can be fixed points, corresponding to
pure strategy Nash equilibria, or cycles. We
show that a very simple measure—the relative
“size” of best reply cycles vs fixed points—
approximately predicts (R-squared > 0.75)
the non-convergence frequency of several well-
known and more realistic learning algorithms
(reinforcement learning, fictitious play, replica-
tor dynamics, experience-weighted attraction,
level-k learning). Some of these learning algo-
rithms have support from human experiments
and incorporate forward-looking bounded ra-
tionality, suggesting that our results describe
the behavior of real players, at least to some
extent.
There exists an enormous literature in
game theory about the equilibrium conver-
gence properties of learning algorithms; the
role of best replies is widely acknowledged
even in introductory courses. This litera-
ture is often mathematically rigorous and fa-
vors exact results in specific classes of games
[12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Our work is complemen-
tary to this literature, as we provide approxi-
mate results for generic games and validate our
results with extensive numerical simulations.
This makes it possible for us to study some
problems that have not been addressed before.
For example, we are able to compute the prob-
ability of convergence in games that have both
best reply cycles and fixed points within the
same game.
Once we have established that the best re-
ply structure has predictive value, we deter-
mine how it changes with the number of moves
and the correlation of the payoffs. We use com-
binatorial methods to analytically compute the
frequency of cycles of different lengths under
the microcanonical ensemble. The idea of us-
ing methods inspired from statistical mechan-
ics is not new in game theory [18]. How-
ever, while existing research has quantified
properties of pure strategy Nash equilibria
[19, 20, 21], mixed strategy equilibria [22, 23]
and Pareto equilibria [24], we are the first to
quantify the frequency and length of best re-
ply cycles. This gives intuition into why con-
vergence to equilibrium fails in generic com-
plicated and competitive games [25] and in-
troduces a formalism that can be extended in
many directions and in different fields. For ex-
ample, our results are also related to the sta-
bility of food webs [7, 17] through replicator
dynamics, and our formalism can be mapped
to Boolean networks, first introduced by Kauff-
man [6] as a model of gene regulation.
When convergence to equilibrium fails we
often observe chaotic learning dynamics [26,
25]. For the six learning algorithms we an-
alyze here the players do not converge to
any sort of intertemporal “chaotic equilibrium”
[27, 28, 29], in the sense that their expectations
do not match the outcomes of the game even in
a statistical sense. In many cases the resulting
attractor is high dimensional, making it diffi-
cult for a ‘rational’ player to outperform other
players by forecasting their moves using statis-
tical methods. Once at least one player sys-
tematically deviates from equilibrium, learn-
ing and heuristics can outperform equilibrium
thinking [30] and can be a better description
for the behavior of players. Chain recurrent
sets [31] and sink equilibria [32] are solution
concepts that may apply in this case.
Results
Best reply structure
Assume a two player normal form game in
which the players are Row and Column, each
playing moves i, j = 1, . . . , N . A best reply
is the move that gives the best payoff in re-
sponse to a given move by an opponent. We
call best reply structure the arrangement of the
best replies in the payoff matrix.
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Table 1: Terminology
Best reply
Move that gives the best payoff in
response to a given move by an
opponent.
Best reply
structure
Arrangement of the best replies in
the payoff matrix.
Best reply
dynamics
Simple learning algorithm in which
the players myopically choose the
best reply to the last move of their
opponent
Best reply
k-cycle
Closed loop of best replies of
length k (each player moves k
times)
Best reply
fixed point
Combination of moves that is a
best reply by both players to a
specific move of their opponent
(pure Nash Eq.)
Best reply
vector v
Set of attractors of best reply
dynamics, ordered from the
longest cycles to the fixed points
Best reply
configura-
tion
Unique set of best replies by both
players to all moves of their
opponent
Free move
/ free best
reply
Move that is neither part of a cycle
or fixed point
To illustrate this concept we use a sim-
ple learning algorithm, best reply dynamics, in
which each player myopically responds with
the best reply to the opponent’s last move.
We consider a particular version of best reply
dynamics in which the two players alternate
moves, each making her best response to her
opponent’s last move.
To see the basic idea consider the game
with N = 4 shown in Fig. 1A. Suppose we
choose (1, 1) as the initial condition. Assume
Column moves first, choosing move SC = 2,
which is the best response to Row’s move SR =
1. Then Row’s best response is SR = 2, then
Column moves SC = 1, etc. This traps the
players in the cycle (1, 1) → (1, 2) → (2, 2) →
(2, 1) → (1, 1), corresponding to the red ar-
rows. We call this a best reply 2-cycle, because
each player moves twice. This cycle is an at-
tractor, as can be seen by the fact that starting
at (3, 2) with a play by Row leads to the cycle.
The first mover can be taken randomly; if the
players are on a cycle, this makes no difference,
1 2 3 4
sC
1
2
3
4
sR
7,-5 2,14 -4,3 -10,-6
-9,16 10,-3 3,15 -3,-7
-8,-9 0,-6 8,1 6,-9
0,2 6,-7 -1,-4 -4,-6
A 1 2 3 4sC
1
2
3
4
sR
1,0 0,1 0,0 0,0
0,1 1,0 0,0 0,0
0,0 0,0 1,1 1,0
0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
B
Figure 1: Illustration of the best reply structure. SR =
{1, 2, 3, 4} and SC = {1, 2, 3, 4} are the possible moves
of players Row and Column and each cell in the matrix
represents their payoffs (Row is given first). The best
response arrows point to the cell corresponding to the
best reply. The vertical arrows correspond to player
Row and the horizontal arrows to player Column. The
arrows are colored red if they are part of a cycle, orange
if they are not part of a cycle but lead to one, blue if
they lead directly to a fixed point, and cyan if they lead
to a fixed point in more than one step. The payoff ma-
trix in B is a Boolean reduction that is constructed to
have the same best reply structure as the payoff matrix
in panel A, but to only have one and zero as its entries.
but when off an attractor it can be impor-
tant. In fact for this example there are two
attractors: If Column had instead gone first,
we would have arrived in one step at the best
reply fixed point at (3, 3) (shown in blue). A
fixed point of the best reply dynamics is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
In Fig. 1B we show a Boolean reduction
of the payoff matrix obtained by replacing all
best replies by one and all other entries by zero.
The Boolean reduction is constructed so that
it has the same best reply structure as the ma-
trix it is derived from, but ignores any other
aspect of the payoffs.1
We characterize the set of attractors of
best reply dynamics in a given N × N pay-
off matrix Π by a best reply vector v(Π) =
(nN , . . . , n2, n1), where n1 is the number of
fixed points, n2 the number of 2-cycles, etc.
For instance v = (0, 0, 1, 1) for the example in
Fig. 1. We define C =
∑N
k=2 nkk as the number
of moves that are part of cycles. The frequency
of non-convergence of best reply dynamics is
approximated by the size of the cycles vs. the
fixed points, that is F(v) = C/(C + n1). In
Fig. 1, F(0, 0, 1, 1) = 2/3. This quantity is
a rough estimate of the combined size of the
1The Boolean reduction of the payoff matrix corresponds to a particular class of Boolean networks [6]. We
plan to report more details on this correspondence in future work.
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basins of attraction of all best reply cycles. It
should be regarded as an average rate of non-
convergence over multiple realizations of pay-
off matrices having the same best reply vector
but different best reply configurations, defined
as the unique set of best replies by both players
to all possible moves of their opponent. While
it is true that best replies that are not on at-
tractors (free best replies) may affect the basins
of attraction, this tends to average out.2
Predictive value
We now show that best reply dynamics pre-
dicts the convergence frequency of six learning
algorithms. Our goal is to characterize the en-
semble of generic games, without constraining
their structure. We do this by using extensive
numerical simulations, generating payoff ma-
trices at random, simulating the learning pro-
cess of the players in a repeated game and then
checking convergence to pure and mixed strat-
egy Nash equilibria. The fact that the behavior
of best reply dynamics is strongly correlated
to the behavior of other learning algorithms
shows that it provides an easy way to study
this problem, and that the results about non-
convergence for best reply dynamics that we
derive in subsequent sections are likely to be
indicative of the behavior of a wide variety of
different learning algorithms.
We consider six learning algorithms that
span different information conditions and lev-
els of rationality. First, reinforcement learning
[33] is based on the idea that players are more
likely to play moves that yielded a better pay-
off in the past. It is the standard learning al-
gorithm that is used with limited information
and/or without sophisticated reasoning, such
as in animal learning. We study the Bush-
Mosteller implementation [34].
Fictitious play [35, 36], our second learn-
ing algorithm, requires more sophistication, as
it assumes that the players construct a mental
model of their opponent. Each player takes
the empirical distribution of her opponent’s
past moves as her mixed strategy, and best
responds to this belief. Third, replicator dy-
namics [37] is commonly used in population
ecology, but bears a strong connection to learn-
ing theory [38]. Fourth, Experience-Weighted
Attraction (EWA) has been proposed [39] to
generalize several learning algorithms, and has
been shown to fit experimental data very well.
So far we have only considered determinis-
tic approximations of the learning algorithms,
resulting from a batch learning assumption:
The players observe the moves of their oppo-
nent a large number of times before updating
their strategies, and so learn based on the ac-
tual mixed strategy of their opponent. The
deterministic assumption is useful to identify
fixed points numerically. As a fifth learning al-
gorithm, we relax this assumption and consider
the stochastic version of EWA. In this version,
the players update their strategies after ob-
serving a single move by their opponent, which
is randomly sampled from her mixed strategy.
This is also called online learning.
Finally, in level-k learning [40], or anticipa-
tory learning [41], the players try to outsmart
their opponent by thinking k steps ahead. For
example, here we consider level-2 EWA learn-
ing. Both players assume that their opponent
is a level-1 learner and update their strategies
using EWA. So the players try to preempt their
opponent based on her predicted move, as op-
posed to acting based on the frequency of her
historical moves. While the players in the other
algorithms are backward-looking, here they are
forward-looking.
The details of the learning algorithms and
the convergence criteria are listed in the Sup-
plementary Information (SI), Section 1. (We
provide a short summary in the Materials and
Methods section.) We simulate learning for
generic games under each of the six algorithms
above. To define the game we randomly gen-
erate payoff matrices for the two players by
sampling from a bivariate Gaussian, which is
the maximum entropy distribution in this case
(see the SI, Section 1.2). The payoff matrix
is held fixed for the duration of each iterated
game. This process is repeated for 1000 ran-
2For example, if all free best replies in Fig. 1 were leading to the cycle, the basin of attraction of the cycle
would be larger than 2/3. But this is an atypical configuration with v = (0, 0, 1, 1).
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Figure 2: Test for how well the best reply structure predicts non-convergence for six learning algorithms. We
generate 1000 random payoff matrices describing games with N = 20 moves and simulate learning from 100
random initial conditions for each one. Each circle corresponds to a specific best reply vector v and its size is the
logarithm of the number of times a payoff matrix with v was sampled. The horizontal axis is the frequency of
non-convergence under best reply dynamics F(v). For example, the largest circle near F(v) = 0.7 corresponds to
v = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 1), which is frequently sampled. The vertical axis gives the frequency of non-convergence in the
simulations, averaged over all payoff matrices and initial conditions having the same v. In the insets simulations
are instead based on Boolean reductions of the payoff matrices. The identity line is plotted for reference.
domly generated payoff matrices, testing 100
different initial conditions for each one. Re-
sults with N = 20 are reported in the main
text and results with N = 5 and N = 50 are
given in the SI, Section 2.
In Fig. 2 we compare the convergence fre-
quency for best reply dynamics to each of the
six learning algorithms. The circles in each
panel correspond to the best reply vectors v,
grouping together all payoff matrices with the
same v. The weight of each best reply vec-
tor is the fraction of (1000) times a payoff ma-
trix with v was sampled. This determines the
size of the circle and is used for the weighted
correlation coefficient R2w. We place each best
reply vector on the horizontal axis according
to its frequency of non-convergence under best
reply dynamics F(v). On the vertical axis we
plot the frequency of non-convergence for each
learning algorithm. Thus if best reply dynam-
ics perfectly predicts the rate of convergence of
the other learning algorithms, all circles should
be centered on the identity line.
There is a strong correlation between the
simulations and the predicted values, with
weighted correlation coefficient R2w > 0.75 in
every case. In reinforcement learning and ficti-
tious play, F(v) overestimates the frequency of
non-convergence. For fictitious play this is be-
cause these algorithms frequently converge to
mixed strategy Nash equilibria, whereas best
reply dynamics can only converge to pure stat-
egy Nash equilibria.3 Nevertheless, apart from
a constant offset, the rates of non-convergence
are proportional. In contrast, two-population
replicator dynamics4 cannot converge to mixed
strategy Nash equilibria [10], and so the rate of
convergence is lower, and there is no offset from
the identity line. In the SI, Section 2, we show
the correlation matrix of the convergence of the
six learning algorithms. We find that conver-
gence co-occurs on average 60% of the times,
3For reinforcement learning, the reason is more technical and is discussed in the SI.
4Here we consider two-population replicator dynamics and not the more standard one-population version
because, focusing on randomly generated games, payoff matrices are asymmetric.
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suggesting a significant degree of heterogeneity
among the algorithms.
Although the correlation is good there is
not always a detailed correspondence in behav-
ior. For example, even when best reply cycles
are absent convergence is not certain. The ver-
tical columns of circles above F(v) = 0 demon-
strate this. This column corresponds to best
reply vectors with no cycles, i.e. those of the
form v = (0, . . . , 0, 0, x), where x = 1, 2, . . .
is the number of distinct fixed points and in-
creases from top to bottom. The circles to the
column on the right correspond instead to best
reply vectors with cycles and no fixed point
(F(v) = 1), with a higher share of cycles from
bottom to top. The learning algorithms may
converge (for example to mixed strategy equi-
libria) in this situation, but there is a clear
trend for less convergence as best reply cycles
become more likely.
The insets show results of simulation runs
with Boolean reductions of the payoff matri-
ces. The correlation is now very strong: In all
cases except fictitious play the weighted cor-
relation is close to unity. The reason the cor-
relations are so strong for the Boolean reduc-
tions is mostly due to the fact that the orig-
inal payoff matrix has continuous values, so
that the learning algorithm may follow what
we call quasi-best replies (see SI, Section 2).
Although the Boolean reduction has precisely
the same best reply dynamics as the original
matrix, the values of the other payoffs can mat-
ter if the learning rule involves history depen-
dence and limited rationality. For instance, in
Fig. 1A, the payoff for Column at (2,3) is 15,
while the payoff at (2,1) is 16. The two pay-
offs are very close and, because of history de-
pendence and limited rationality, player Col-
umn might choose move 3 rather than move
1, thereby breaking out of the best reply cy-
cle and reaching the fixed point. For the case
of fictitious play there is also the problem of
convergence to mixed strategy Nash equilibria,
which is why the correlation for the Boolean
reduction is much lower.
In summary, there exists a robust correla-
tion between the average probability of con-
vergence and the best reply structure. This is
true even though the trajectory of best reply
dynamics does not necessarily predict the or-
bits of the other learning algorithms and the
probability of convergence in any specific pay-
off matrix cannot be exactly calculated from
the share of best reply cycles.
Variation of the best reply structure
We now investigate the prevalence of best reply
cycles and fixed points as we vary the proper-
ties of the games. Intensively studied classes
of games such as coordination, supermodu-
lar, dominance solvable and potential games
[12, 13, 14, 15, 16] are all best reply acyclic.
When is this typical and when is it rare?
In agreement with Galla and Farmer [25],
we find that two key parameters of a game are
the number of possible moves N and the corre-
lation Γ between the payoffs of the two players.
As N increases, it is intuitively clear that the
game becomes harder to learn, but it is not ob-
vious how this affects the best reply structure.
To understand how Γ affects convergence, we
generate payoff matrices so that the expected
value of the product of the payoffs to players
Row and Column for any given combination of
moves is equal to Γ. A negative correlation,
Γ < 0, implies that the game is competitive,
because what is good for one player is likely to
be bad for the other. The extreme case is where
Γ = −1, meaning the game is zero-sum. In
contrast Γ > 0 encourages cooperation, in the
sense that the payoffs tend to be either good
for both players or bad for both players. This
intuitively increases the chances for pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria, but it is not clear what it
means for best reply cycles.
In Fig. 3 we show how the share of best
reply cycles varies with N and Γ. For a given
value of N and Γ we randomly generate payoff
matrices and compute the average frequency
of non-convergence F(v). We compare this
to the average frequency of non-convergence
of the EWA learning algorithm. (We choose
EWA because it is the most general learning
rule among the six algorithms; its behavior is
typical). The good match between the markers
and the dashed lines is a confirmation of the
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Figure 3: How the best reply structure and the rate of
convergence of EWA change with the number of moves
N and with the average correlation Γ between the pay-
offs of the two players. Dashed lines are the share of
best reply cycles F(v) (i.e. the rate of non-convergence
of best reply dynamics). Markers are the fraction of
simulation runs of EWA that does not converge. A
negative correlation Γ increases the share of best reply
cycles; a positive correlation has the opposite effect.
Best reply cycles become predominant as N increases
(as long as Γ is not large and positive).
results in Fig. 2 and provides further evidence
of the predictive value of the best reply struc-
ture. The only exception is for Γ = 0 and
N ≥ 30, where best reply dynamics overes-
timates the frequency of non-convergence of
EWA.
We find that best reply cycles become
prevalent when Γ is not positive and N is suf-
ficiently large. In this region of the parameter
space acyclic games are extremely rare. There-
fore, dominance-solvable, coordination, poten-
tial and supermodular games represent a small
fraction of all possible payoff matrices that can
be created for those N and Γ.
Analytical approach
For Γ = 0 it is possible to derive analytically
how the best reply structure varies with N .
The total number of possible best reply con-
figurations is N2N . If Γ = 0 all payoff matrices
Π are equally likely. Therefore we can compute
the frequency ρ(v) for any set of attractors v
by counting the number of best reply configu-
rations leading to v. In the jargon of statistical
mechanics, we are assuming a micro-canonical
ensemble of games.
Here we just sketch the derivation, refer-
ring the reader to the SI (Section 3.1) for a
detailed explanation. Because of independence
the frequency ρ(v) can be written as a prod-
uct of terms f corresponding to the number of
ways to obtain each type of attractor, multi-
plied by a term g for free moves (best replies
that are not on attractors). We denote by n
the number of moves per player which are not
already part of cycles or fixed points.
The function f(n, k) counts the ways to
have a k-cycle (including fixed points, which
are cycles of length k = 1),
f(n, k) =
(
n
k
)2
k!(k − 1)!, (1)
where the binomial coefficient means that for
each player we can choose any k moves out of n
to form cycles or fixed points, and the factorials
quantify all combinations of best replies that
yield cycles or fixed points with the selected k
moves. For instance in Fig. 1, for each player
we can choose any 2 moves out of 4 to form a
2-cycle, and for each of these there are two pos-
sible cycles (one clockwise and the other coun-
terclockwise). The number of ways to have a 2-
cycle is f(4, 2) = 72. Similarly, for each player
we can select any move out of the remaining
two to form a fixed point, in f(2, 1) = 4 ways.
In this example, for both players we can
still freely choose one best reply, provided this
does not form another fixed point (otherwise
the best reply vector would be different). In
Fig. 1, the free best replies are (3, 4) for Row
and (4, 1) for Column. In general, gN (n, d)
counts the number of ways to combine the re-
maining n free best replies in a N × N payoff
matrix so that they do not form other cycles
or fixed points,
gN (n, d) = N
2n−
n∑
k=1
f(n, k)gN (n−k, d+1)/(d+1).
(2)
The first term N2n quantifies all possible com-
binations of the free best replies, and the sum-
mation counts the “forbidden” combinations,
i.e. the ones that form cycles or fixed points.
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Figure 4: Comparison of analytical predictions about
best reply cycles to numerical simulations when Γ = 0.
Markers are numerical results and solid lines are ana-
lytical results. Red circles depict the frequency of ran-
domly generated payoff matrices with no fixed points
(F(v) = 1), blue triangles show the frequency with at
least one cycle (F(v) > 0). The text in the figure refers
to the area delimited by solid lines, e.g. “cycles + fixed
points” means that the fraction of payoff matrices with
both cycles and fixed points is the distance between the
red and blue lines. Finally, green squares represent the
average share of best reply cycles FN ; this is discontin-
ued at N = 50 due to excessive computational cost, see
the SI, Section 3.2)
This term has a recursive structure. It counts
the number of ways to form each type of at-
tractor, and then the number of ways not to
have other attractors with the remaining n−k
moves. Note that N is a parameter and there-
fore is indicated as a subscript, while n is a
recursion variable. d denotes the recursion
depth. Finally, the division by d+1 is needed to
prevent double, triple, etc. counting of attrac-
tors. In the example of Fig. 1, g4(1, 0) = 15.
For any given best reply vector v =
(nN , . . . , n2, n1) the general expression for its
frequency ρ is
ρ(v) =
 N∏
k=1
nk∏
j=1
f
(
N −∑Nl=k+1 nll − (j − 1)k, k)
j

× gN
(
N −
N∑
l=1
nll, 0
)/(
N2N
)
.
(3)
The product in the first brackets counts all pos-
sible ways to have the set of attractors v. The
first argument of f , N −∑Nl=k+1 nll− (j− 1)k,
iteratively quantifies the number of moves that
are not already part of other attractors. The
division by j, like the division by d + 1 in Eq.
(2), is needed to prevent double, triple, etc.
counting of attractors. The second term gN
counts all possible ways to position the free
best replies so that they do not form other at-
tractors. The first argument of gN is the count
of moves that are not part of attractors, and
the initial recursion depth is 0. Finally, we ob-
tain the frequency by dividing by all possible
configurations N2N . For the payoff matrix in
Fig. 1, ρ(0, 0, 1, 1) = f(4, 2)f(2, 1)g4(1, 0)/4
8 =
0.07.
Eq. (3) can then be used to compute the
ensemble average of non-convergence of best
reply dynamics F for any given N ,
FN =
∑
v
ρ(v)F(v), (4)
summing over all possible v s.t.
∑N
k=1 nkk ≤
N . It is also possible to calculate other quan-
tities, including the fraction of payoff matrices
without fixed points (F(v) = 1) and without
cycles (F(v) = 0). We provide the expressions
and explain their derivation in the SI (Section
3.2).
In Fig. 4 we analyze the best reply struc-
ture for increasing values of N . We report,
from bottom to top, the fraction of payoff ma-
trices with no fixed points, the average share
of best reply cycles FN , and the fraction of
games with at least one cycle. For instance,
for N = 30, 36% of the payoff matrices have
no fixed points, 84% have at least one cycle,
(so 16% have no cycles, and 48% have a mix-
ture of cycles and fixed points), with an aver-
age FN = 0.70. There is a very good agree-
ment between analytical results (solid lines)
and Monte Carlo sampling (markers). The
fraction of games with cycles is an increasing
function of N ; it is computationally intractable
to compute this for large N , but it seems to be
tending to one. However, the fraction of games
with at least one fixed point seems to reach a
fixed value for N → ∞. In Section 3.3 of the
SI we show that this is approximated by 1/3,
in agreement with numerical simulations.
Discussion
We have proposed a new formalism that helps
understand the conditions under which learn-
ing in repeated games fails to converge to an
equilibrium. For the six learning algorithms we
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have studied here non-convergence is strongly
correlated with the presence of best reply cy-
cles. When they fail to converge, the trajecto-
ries through the strategy space do not closely
match best reply cycles. Instead, as shown by
Galla and Farmer for EWA [25], the typical
case is chaotic dynamics.5 Why, then, is the
presence of best reply cycles closely correlated
with non-convergence? Our hypothesis is that
the presence of best reply cycles indicates more
complex nonlinear structure in the payoff space
that makes convergence to an equilibrium more
difficult.
Mapping out the best reply structure
has the advantage of being simple and
straightforward—there are no adjustable pa-
rameters and no learning takes place. As we
have shown here, this makes it possible to use
combinatorics to analytically explore the space
of all games under the micro-canonical ensem-
ble, using the conceptual framework of statis-
tical mechanics.
This work can be extended in several di-
rections. It should be possible to account for
quasi-best replies, history dependence and lim-
ited rationality by studying modified versions
of best reply dynamics. For example, we could
allow for noisy best replies, in which the players
select with a certain probability a move which
is not a best reply. We could also allow for
level-k reasoning in best reply dynamics, to
investigate the role of forward vs. backward
looking strategies.
On a different note, it would also be inter-
esting to characterize the best reply structure
in games with more than two players. Our
preliminary results indicate that higher-order
structures may be relevant. For example, in
three-player games two players could be in a
best reply cycle, but the remaining player may
not. Additionally, we could analyze other en-
sembles of payoff matrices, for example intro-
ducing ordinal constraints.
Finally, the method introduced in this pa-
per can be related to ecology. Generalized
Lotka-Volterra equations are equivalent to the
replicator dynamics [37], so it may be possi-
ble to connect the best reply structure to the
network properties of food webs [7]. In Ref.
[42] the authors show that stable subgraphs are
statistically overrepresented in empirical food
webs, thereby reducing feedback loops. Our
preliminary investigations show that loops in
food webs are a sufficient but not necessary
condition for best reply cycles in the corre-
sponding payoff matrix.
The main implication of our paper is this:
If real-world situations that can be described
as a two-player game are represented to some
extent by an ensemble of randomly constructed
games and if real players can be approximately
described by learning algorithms like the ones
we study here, equilibrium is likely to be an un-
realistic behavioral assumption when the num-
ber of moves is large and the game is compet-
itive.
Materials and Methods
We summarize here the protocol that was used
to simulate the learning algorithms in Figures
2 and 3. We just report the minimal infor-
mation that would allow replication of the re-
sults. A more detailed description, in which we
provide behavioral explanations and mention
alternative specifications, is given in the Sup-
plementary Information, Section 1. We had
to make arbitrary choices about convergence
criteria and parameter values, but when test-
ing alternative specifications we found that the
correlation coefficients had changed by no more
than a few decimal units. This confirms a ro-
bust correlation between the rate of conver-
gence of best-reply dynamics and that of the
six learning algorithms.
Consider a 2-player, N -moves normal form
game. We index the players by µ ∈ {Row =
R, Column = C} and their moves by i, j =
1, . . . N . Let xµi (t) be the probability for player
µ to play move i at time t, i.e. the i-th com-
ponent of her mixed strategy vector. For no-
tational convenience, we also denote by xi(t)
5Bush-Mosteller learning, fictitious play and replicator dynamics all have infinite memory. We observe un-
stable orbits in which one strategy takes over the others, and this happens periodically with a period increasing
exponentially over time. See the SI, Section 1, for examples.
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the probability for player R to play move i at
time t, and by yj(t) the probability for player
C to play move j at time t. We further de-
note by sµ(t) the move which is actually taken
by player µ at time t, and by s−µ(t) the move
taken by her opponent. The payoff matrix for
player µ is Πµ, with Πµ(i, j) as the payoff µ re-
ceives if she plays move i and the other player
chooses move j. So if player Row plays move i
and player Column plays move j, they receive
payoffs ΠR(i, j) and ΠC(j, i) respectively.
Reinforcement learning
We only describe player Row, because the
learning algorithm for Column is equivalent.
Player Row at time t has a level of aspiration
AR(t) that updates as
AR(t+ 1) = (1− α)AR(t)+
α
∑
i,j
xi(t)Π
R(i, j)yj(t),
(5)
where α is a parameter. For each move i and
at each time t player Row has a level of satis-
faction σRi (t) given by
σRi (t) =
∑
ij xi(t)yj(t)
(
ΠR(i, j)−AR(t))
maxi,j |ΠR(i, j)−AR(t)| .
(6)
All components of the mixed strategy vector
are updated. The update rule is
xi(t+1) = xi(t)+xi(t)∆xi(t)+
∑
j 6=i
xj(t)∆xij(t).
(7)
Here, ∆xi(t) is the contribution due to the
choice of move i by player Row (which oc-
curs with probability xi(t), hence the multi-
plying term), and ∆xij(t) is the contribution
on move i due to the choice of another move j
(i.e. a normalization update), each occurring
with probability xj(t). We have
∆xi(t) =
{
βσRi (t)(1− xi(t)), σRi (t) > 0,
βσRi (t)xi(t), σ
R
i (t) < 0,
(8)
and
∆xij(t) =
{
−βσRj (t)xi(t), σRj (t) > 0,
−βσRj (t)xj(t)xi(t)1−xj(t) , σRj (t) < 0,
(9)
with β being a parameter.
Starting from random mixed strategy
vectors—the initialization of the mixed strate-
gies will be identical for all learning algorithms
that follow—and null levels of aspiration and
satisfaction, we iterate the dynamics in Eqs.
(5)-(9) for 5000 time steps (we set α = 0.2
and β = 0.5). To identify the simulation
run as convergent we only consider the last
20% of the time steps and the components of
the mixed strategy vectors played with aver-
age probability greater than 1/N in this time
interval. If the standard deviation averaged
over these components and time steps is larger
than 0.01, the simulation run is identified as
non-convergent.
Fictitious play
Player Row calculates the j-th component of
the expected mixed strategy of Column at time
T , which we denote by y˜j(T ), as the fraction
of times that j has been played in the past:
y˜j(T ) =
∑T
t=1 I(j, s
C(t))
T
. (10)
In the above equation, I(a, b) is the indicator
function, I(a, b) = 1 if a = b and I(a, b) = 0 if
a 6= b. Player Row then selects the move that
maximizes the expected payoff at time T ,
i(T ) = argmaxk
∑
j
ΠR(k, j)y˜j(T ). (11)
The behavior of Column is equivalent. We use
the same convergence criteria and the same
length of the simulation runs as in reinforce-
ment learning. There are no parameters in fic-
titious play.
Replicator dynamics
We use the discrete-time replicator dynamics
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)+
xi(t)δt
∑
j
ΠR(i, j)yj(t)−
∑
kj
xk(t)Π
R(k, j)yj(t)
 ,
yj(t+ 1) = yj(t)+
yj(t)δt
(∑
i
ΠC(j, i)xi(t)−
∑
ik
yk(t)Π
C(k, i)xi(t)
)
,
(12)
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where δt = 0.1 is the integration step. Here
the length of the simulation run is endoge-
nously determined by the first component of
the mixed strategy vector hitting the machine
precision boundary. (Since replicator dynam-
ics is of multiplicative nature, the components
drift exponentially towards the faces of the
strategy simplex and quickly reach the ma-
chine precision boundaries). In order to ver-
ify convergence, we check if the largest com-
ponent of the mixed strategy vector of each
player has been monotonously increasing over
the last 20% of the time steps, and if all other
components have been monotonously decreas-
ing in the same time interval.
Experience-Weighted Attraction
Each player µ at time t has an attraction Qµi (t)
towards move i. The attractions update as
Q
µ
i (t+1) =
(1− α)N (t)Qµi (t) + (δ + (1− δ)x
µ
i (t))
∑
j Π
µ(i, j)yj(t)
N (t + 1) ,
(13)
where α and δ are parameters and N (t) is in-
terpreted as experience. Experience updates as
N (t+ 1) = (1− α)(1− κ)N (t) + 1, where κ is
a parameter. Attractions map to probabilities
through a logit function
xµi (t+ 1) =
eβQ
µ
i (t+1)∑
j e
βQµj (t+1)
, (14)
where β is a parameter. We simulate Eqs.
(13)-(14) for 500 time steps, starting with
N (0) = 1. The parameter values are α = 0.18,
β =
√
N , κ = 1 and δ = 1. If in the
last 100 time steps the average log-variation
is larger than 0.01, the simulation run is iden-
tified as non-convergent. In formula, we check
if 1/N
∑N
i=1 5/T
∑T
t=4/5T (log xi(t))
2 > 10−2,
and equivalently for Column.
Experience-Weighted Attraction with
noise
We replace Eq. (13) by
Q
µ
i (t+1) =
(1− α)N (t)Qµi (t) + (δ + (1− δ)I(i, sµ(t + 1))Πµ(i, s−µ(t + 1))
N (t + 1) ,
(15)
i.e. we consider online learning. The param-
eter values are the same, except β =
√
N/2.
The convergence criteria are different. In-
deed, we run the dynamics for 5000 time steps
and—as in reinforcement learning—we con-
sider only the last 20% of the time steps and
only the components of the mixed strategy vec-
tors played with average probability greater
than 1/N in this time interval. We then we
identify the position of the fixed point, and we
classify the run as non-convergent if play was
farther than 0.02 from the fixed point in more
than 10% of the time steps (i.e. in at least 100
time steps).
Level-k learning
Let FR(·) and FC(·) be the EWA updates
for players Row and Column respectively, i.e.
if both players use EWA then x(t + 1) =
FR(x(t), y(t)) and y(t + 1) = FC(x(t), y(t)).
(x and y without a subscript indicate the full
mixed strategy vector.) Then if Column is a
level-2 learner, she updates her strategies ac-
cording to y2(t + 1) = FC (x(t+ 1), y(t)) =
FC
(
FR(x(t), y(t)), y(t)
)
. Row behaves equiva-
lently. In the simulations we assume that both
players are level-2 and use the same parameters
and convergence criteria as in EWA.
Payoff matrices
For each payoff matrix, we randomly generate
N2 pairs of payoffs—if Row plays i and Column
plays j, a pair (a, b) implies that Row receives
payoff a, Column gets payoff b. We then keep
the payoff matrix fixed for the rest of the sim-
ulation. Each pair is randomly sampled from
a bivariate Gaussian distribution with mean 0,
variance 1 and covariance Γ.
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Supplemental information for:
Best reply structure and equilibrium
convergence in generic games
S1 Details of the simulation protocol
We describe here in detail how we produce Figs. 2 and 3 of the main paper.6 We have to
simulate very different learning algorithms over high-dimensional random games and to identify
the simulation runs that converge to equilibrium. This leads to unavoidable arbitrary choices
in the specification of the learning algorithms, the value of the parameters and the criteria that
determine convergence. We have experimented a lot of combinations of design choices, and
the overall picture is robust to the specific implementation.7 Only the weighted correlation
coefficients change by a few decimal units.
We describe all these issues in detail in Section S1.1. In Section S1.2 we explain how we
generate the payoff matrices.
S1.1 Learning algorithms
We analyze six learning algorithms: reinforcement learning, fictitious play, replicator dynamics,
Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA), EWA with noise and level-k learning. For each of
these, we provide a high-level qualitative description, we define them formally, and we specify
the convergence criteria and the value of the parameters. We also explain the numerical issues
we need to address.
For example in the case of reinforcement learning, fictitious play and replicator dynamics
the algorithms have infinite memory and so cannot reach a fixed point in finite simulation time.
In order to cope with this we need to introduce approximations that we detail here. Another
example of a challenging problem is the loss of normalization due to numeric approximations
and rounding errors. In the case of EWA, EWA with noise and level-k learning the memory is
finite, so it is easier to identify fixed points. However, if memory is too short, some algorithms
converge to fixed points in the center of the simplex in which the players randomize among their
moves, independently of the payoff matrix. These fixed points can be arbitrarily far from Nash
equilibria. Therefore, we need to choose parameter values that make the structure of the game
potentially determine convergence.
One important general point is that in real experiments learning algorithms are stochastic,
in the sense that at each round of the game the players sample one move with probability deter-
mined by their mixed strategy vector. However, we wish to take a deterministic approximation,
as it is much easier to identify whether the learning dynamics converge to a fixed strategy. This
approximation is usually achieved by assuming that the players observe a large sample of moves
by their opponent before updating their mixed strategies [S1].8 In the jargon of machine learn-
ing, the deterministic approximation corresponds to batch learning, while the stochastic version
is online learning. We consider batch learning in five cases, but we also study one instance of
online learning (EWA with noise) and show that the results are robust to stochasticity.
6The code is available upon request to the corresponding author.
7Unless we choose a parameter setting in which, for example, all learning dynamics converge to fixed points
arbitrarily far from Nash equilibria irrespective of the payoff matrix. See below.
8This assumption was justified by Conlisk [S2] in terms of two-rooms experiments: the players are in two
separate rooms and need to play against each other many times before they know the outcome of the stage game.
Bloomfield [S3] implemented this idea in an experimental setup.
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Another important general point is that we check convergence to fixed points, but these
may or may not correspond to Nash equilibria. For example, if fictitious play converges to
a fixed point then this is a Nash equilibrium [S4],9 but as mentioned above EWA with very
short memory might converge to fixed points which are arbitrarily far from Nash equilibria.
Unfortunately, calculating the full set of Nash equilibria and then checking the distance from
the simulated fixed points is computationally unfeasible in games with a large number of moves.
In the specific case of 2 × 2 games and EWA, with sufficiently long memory the fixed points
are very close to Nash equilibria (e.g. at a distance of 10−6 or less) [S6]. As the frequency of
convergence of EWA, EWA with noise, level-k learning and reinforcement learning shows very
similar properties (cf. Fig. 2 in the main paper) to fictitious play and replicator dynamics
– which reach Nash equilibria exactly – we believe that the lack of perfect correspondence
between fixed points and Nash equilibria is not a major issue. If anything, convergence to Nash
equilibrium would be even more unlikely, strengthening the main message of our paper.
S1.1.1 Notation
Consider a 2-player, N -moves normal form game. We index the players by µ ∈ {Row =
R,Column = C} and their moves by i, j = 1, . . . N . Let xµi (t) be the probability for player µ
to play move i at time t, i.e. the i-th component of his mixed strategy vector. For notational
simplicity, we also denote by xi(t) the probability for player R to play move i at time t, and by
yj(t) the probability for player C to play move j at time t. We further denote by sµ(t) the move
which is actually taken by player µ at time t, and by s−µ(t) the move taken by his opponent.
The payoff matrix for player µ is Πµ, with Πµ(i, j) as the payoff µ receives if he plays move i
and the other player chooses move j. So if player Row plays strategy i and player Column plays
strategy j, they receive payoffs ΠR(i, j) and ΠC(j, i) respectively.
S1.1.2 Reinforcement Learning
As an example of reinforcement learning, we study the Bush-Mosteller learning algorithm [S7],
using the specification in Refs. [S8] and [S9]. This is not the only possible choice for reinforce-
ment learning. For example, other algorithms have been proposed by Erev and Roth [S10]. We
focus on the Bush-Mosteller algorithm because it is the most different learning rule from the
other algorithms we consider.10
In the Bush-Mosteller version of reinforcement learning, each player has a certain level of
aspiration, i.e. his discounted average payoff. This leads to a satisfaction for each move –
positive if the payoff the player gets as a consequence of choosing that move is larger than the
aspiration level, negative otherwise. The probability to repeat a certain move is increased if the
satisfaction was positive, decreased if it was negative.
Formal definition More formally, let Aµ(t) be the aspiration level for player µ at time t. It
evolves according to
Aµ(t+ 1) = (1− α)Aµ(t) + αΠµ(sµ(t), s−µ(t)). (S1)
Aspiration is a weighted average of the payoff received at time t, Πµ(sµ(t), s−µ(t)), and past
aspiration levels. Therefore, payoffs received in the past are discounted by a factor 1−α. Here
9Furthermore, the only stable fixed points of two-population replicator dynamics are pure strategy Nash
equilibria [S5].
10On the contrary, the Erev-Roth algorithm can be viewed as a special case of EWA, see Section S1.1.5.
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α represents the rate of memory loss. Satisfaction is defined by
σµi (t) =
Πµ (i, s−µ(t))−Aµ(t)
maxi,j |Πµ(i, j)−Aµ(t)| . (S2)
After taking move i at time t, player µ has a positive satisfaction if the payoff he received is
higher than his aspiration. Note that α is also called habituation, as a repeated choice of move
i by player µ leads the aspiration level to correspond to the payoff for move i. Satisfaction
would then approach zero, as the player gets habituated. In Eq. (S2), the denominator is a
normalization factor that keeps σ within -1 and +1.[S8] The probability to play move i again
is updated as
xµi (t+ 1) =
{
xµi (t) + βσ
µ
i (t)(1− xµi (t)), σµi (t) > 0,
xµi (t) + βσ
µ
i (t)x
µ
i (t), σ
µ
i (t) < 0.
(S3)
In the above equation β is the learning rate. Positive satisfaction leads to an increase of the
probability (but habituation slows and eventually stops the rise, because habituation decreases
the satisfaction), negative satisfaction has the opposite effect. The probabilities for the moves
that were not taken are updated from the normalization condition. Denoting them by j 6= i,
we have
xµj (t+ 1) =
x
µ
j (t)− βσµi (t)xµj (t), σµi (t) > 0,
xµj (t)− βσµi (t)
xµi (t)x
µ
j (t)
1−xµi (t)
, σµi (t) < 0.
(S4)
The learning algorithm described so far is stochastic. As mentioned before, we wish to take
a deterministic limit in which the players observe a large sample of moves by their opponent
before updating their mixed strategies. We assume that the sample is large enough so that it
can be identified with the mixed strategy vector. For simplicity, we switch to the notation in
which xRi (t) ≡ xi(t) and xCj (t) ≡ yj(t). We also only consider player Row, because the learning
algorithm for Column is equivalent. Aspiration updates as
AR(t+ 1) = (1− α)AR(t) + α
∑
i,j
xi(t)Π
R(i, j)yj(t). (S5)
Satisfaction is calculated for all moves i which are played with positive probability:
σRi (t) =
∑
ij xi(t)yj(t)
(
ΠR(i, j)−AR(t))
maxi,j |ΠR(i, j)−AR(t)| . (S6)
Finally, all components of the mixed strategy vector are updated both as if they were played,
or as if they were not played, depending on the probabilities xi(t). The update rule is
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + xi(t)∆xi(t) +
∑
j 6=i
xj(t)∆xij(t). (S7)
Here, ∆xi(t) is the contribution due to the choice of move i by player Row (which occurs with
probability xi(t), hence the multiplying term), and ∆xij(t) is the contribution on move i due to
the choice of another move j (i.e. the normalization update), each occurring with probability
xj(t). Following Eqs. (S3) and (S4), we have
∆xi(t) =
{
βσRi (t)(1− xi(t)), σRi (t) > 0,
βσRi (t)xi(t), σ
R
i (t) < 0,
(S8)
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Figure S1: Instances of simulation runs of the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning algorithm with N = 20.
Each line is a component of the mixed strategy vector of Row (not all components are visible, as they overlap).
Left panels: non-converging simulation run. Right panels: converging simulation run. Top panels: linear scale.
Bottom panels: logarithmic scale on the vertical axis. Only the first 2000 out of 5000 time steps are shown.
and11
∆xij(t) =
{
−βσRj (t)xi(t), σRj (t) > 0,
−βσRj (t)xj(t)xi(t)1−xj(t) , σRj (t) < 0.
(S9)
Convergence criteria In Figure S1 we show instances of both converging and non-converging
simulation runs. As is clear from the logarithmic plots in the bottom panels, no components of
the mixed strategy vector ever reach a fixed point within simulation time. The reason is simple:
Eqs. (S7) do not have a memory loss term, so the probability for unsuccessful strategies keeps
decreasing over time. Only numeric approximations would yield a fixed point, but under most
parameter settings the Bush-Mosteller dynamics takes very long to reach the machine precision
boundary.
Therefore, we choose a simple heuristic to determine if the learning dynamics has reached a
fixed point:
1. Only consider the last 20% time steps.
2. Only keep the moves that have been played with a frequency larger than 1/N .
3. If the average standard deviation (i.e. averaged over the most frequent moves) is larger
than 0.01, identify the simulation run as non-convergent. Otherwise, identify it as con-
vergent.
We experimented with slightly different specifications, with no significant effects on the results.
11Note the small notational clutter between Eq. (S3) and Eq. (S9). In Eq. (S3) move j was updated as
a consequence of playing move i. In Eq. (S9) move i is updated as a consequence of playing move j, with
probability xj(t).
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Parameter values If the aspiration memory loss α and/or the learning rate β are very
small, the learning dynamics always reaches fixed points at the center of the strategy simplex,
irrespective of the payoff matrix. In this fixed point the players simply randomize between
all moves. In a certain sense, they are not learning from playing the game. Except from this
unrealistic situation, we do not observe much sensitivity to the parameter values.12 We perform
the simulations with α = 0.2 and β = 0.5.
We simulate the learning dynamics by iterating Eqs. (S7) for 5000 time steps.13
S1.1.3 Fictitious Play
Fictitious play was first proposed as an algorithm to calculate the Nash equilibria of a game, and
later interpreted as a learning algorithm [S11, S4]. It is an example of belief learning. Instead
of learning based on the experienced payoffs, as in reinforcement learning, the players update
their beliefs on what move could be taken by their opponent, and react to their beliefs.
In fictitious play, each player takes the empirical distribution of moves by her opponent
as an estimate of his mixed strategy, calculates the expected payoff of her moves given this
belief, and chooses the move that maximizes her expected payoff. Here we study the standard
fictitious play algorithm, in which the players weigh all past moves equally, and choose the best
performing move with certainty. Variants include [S12] weighted fictitious play, in which the
players discount the past moves of their opponent and give higher weight to the more recent
moves, and stochastic fictitious play, in which the players select the best performing move with
a certain probability, and potentially all other moves with a smaller probability.
We focus on the standard fictitious play algorithm because the other versions are simply a
special case of EWA (see Section S1.1.5).
Formal definition Player Row calculates the j-th component of the expected mixed strategy
of Column at time T , which we denote by y˜j(T ), simply as the fraction of times that j has been
played in the past:
y˜j(T ) =
∑T
t=1 I(j, s
C(t))
T
. (S10)
In the above equation, I(a, b) is the indicator function, I(a, b) = 1 if a = b and I(a, b) = 0 if
a 6= b. Player Row then selects the move that maximizes the expected payoff at time T ,14
i(T ) = argmax
k
∑
j
ΠR(k, j)y˜j(T ). (S11)
The behavior of Column is equivalent.
Convergence criteria We look at the convergence of the estimated mixed strategy vectors
at time t, x˜i(t) and y˜j(t). As it is clear from Figure S2, the behavior of fictitious play is very
similar to that of Bush-Mosteller dynamics. Therefore, we use the same convergence criteria.
Note that changing the expected strategies takes more and more time as t increases. In a certain
sense, the behavior of the players becomes more set, as they need more sampling evidence to
change their expectations.
12If β is too large, we get numerical problems, as the learning dynamics overshoots the strategy simplex
boundaries.
13For N = 5, numeric approximations make the dynamics lose normalization after 2000 time steps. In this
case we simulate for 2000 time steps only.
14Because we study payoff matrices with random coefficients, it is almost impossible that two moves yield the
same payoff. If that was the case, usually the player selects among such moves with equal probability.
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Figure S2: Instances of simulation runs of fictitious play with N = 20. Each line is a component of the mixed
strategy vector of Row (not all components are visible, as they overlap). Left panels: non-converging simulation
run. Right panels: converging simulation run. Top panels: linear scale. Bottom panels: logarithmic scale on the
vertical axis. We show here 50000 time steps, although 5000 iterations turned out to be enough to measure the
convergence rate almost as accurately.
Parameter values Fictitious play has no parameters. We only need to choose the maximum
number of iterations, which we take as 5000. We experimented with longer time series (50000
time steps), but the tradeoff between accuracy and speed was unfavorable.
S1.1.4 Replicator Dynamics
Replicator dynamics [S13] is the standard tool used in evolutionary game theory [S14]. It is a
stylized model representing the evolution of individuals with certain traits in a population. The
fitness of each trait depends on the population shares of the other traits, and on the average
fitness. Although it is mostly used in population biology, the replicator dynamics has also been
studied as a learning algorithm in game theory. The key connection is through the population
of ideas [S15]. Each move can be viewed as a trait, and the evolution of the population shares
of each trait corresponds to the dynamics of the components of the mixed strategy vector.
The most typical form of replicator dynamics only concerns one population. If the payoff
matrix is symmetric, the game can be seen as between a focal player and the rest of the
population. However, being concerned with generic and randomly determined two-player games,
the payoff matrix is typically asymmetric. This naturally leads to two-population replicator
dynamics. The dynamical properties of the two-population version are different from those of
the one-population algorithm. For our purposes, the most important difference is that one-
population replicator dynamics typically converges to mixed strategy Nash equilibria, whereas
two-population replicator dynamics only converges to strict Nash equilibria (i.e. pure strategy
Nash equilibria in which the payoff at equilibrium is strictly larger than any other payoff that
can be obtained if the opponent does not change his move) [10].
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Figure S3: Instances of simulation runs of replicator dynamics with N = 20. Each line is a component of the
mixed strategy vector of Row (not all components are visible, as they overlap). Left panels: non-converging
simulation run. Right panels: converging simulation run. Top panels: linear scale. Bottom panels: logarithmic
scale on the vertical axis. The maximum simulation time (1500 or 500 time steps) is endogenously determined
by the first component of the mixed strategy vector hitting the machine precision boundary.
Formal definition Letting xi and yj denote the population shares of individuals with traits
i and j respectively, two-population replicator dynamics reads
x˙i(t) = xi(t)
∑
j
ΠR(i, j)yj(t)−
∑
kj
xk(t)Π
R(k, j)yj(t)
 ,
y˙j(t) = yj(t)
(∑
i
ΠC(j, i)xi(t)−
∑
ik
yk(t)Π
C(k, i)xi(t)
)
.
(S12)
The shares of trait i in population Row and trait j in population Column evolve according to
the fitness of that trait (as given by the expected payoff) compared to the average fitness in the
respective population [37].
Replicator dynamics needs to be discretized for simulation. We use the Euler discretization
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + xi(t)δt
∑
j
ΠR(i, j)yj(t)−
∑
kj
xk(t)Π
R(k, j)yj(t)
 ,
yj(t+ 1) = yj(t) + yj(t)δt
(∑
i
ΠC(j, i)xi(t)−
∑
ik
yk(t)Π
C(k, i)xi(t)
)
,
(S13)
where δt is the integration step.
Convergence criteria In Figure S3 we can see the technical problems associated with sim-
ulating the replicator dynamics. First, because only strict Nash equilibria are stable, all stable
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fixed points sit at the boundaries of the probability simplex and cannot be reached in finite
simulation time. Second, the period of cycles increases over time (due to the infinite memory of
the replicator equations), and even unstable dynamics drifts towards the edges of the probability
simplex.
Third, while in the cases of Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning and fictitious play the
components of the mixed strategy vector were changing by relatively few orders of magnitude,
the functional form of the replicator dynamics (S12) implies an exponential change.15 Therefore,
the map (S13) can be reliably simulated only for a limited confidence time interval : we stop
the simulation run as soon as one component xi or yj reaches the machine precision limits.
16
This precaution is necessary because, if the dynamics is following a cycle, a certain move
may not be played for a long time interval, with its probability decreasing over time. At some
point, it may become convenient for the player to choose that move again, so the probability
would start increasing again. But if the probability had hit the precision limits of the computer
beforehand, it would be stuck at zero, falsely identifying the simulation run as having reached
a fixed point.
Another problem concerns rounding approximations, which imply that normalization may
be lost. If that happens, we stop the simulation run and discard the results.
With the integration step we choose, the confidence time interval is on average of the order
of 1000 time steps (but can vary considerably, as can be seen in Figure S3). We could use
the same convergence criteria as for Bush-Mosteller dynamics and fictitious play, but the short
simulation time and the shape of the cycles – in linear scale, the dynamics is constant for a
long time, and then suddenly changes – suggest to use a different heuristic. We check whether
in the last 20% of the time steps the probabilities of the most used move for both players are
monotonically increasing, while all other probabilities are monotonically decreasing. In other
words
1. Only consider the last 20% time steps.
2. For each player, find the move with the highest probability, and verify whether this prob-
ability has been increasing for the full time interval.
3. Check that the probabilities for all other moves have been decreasing.
4. If conditions 2-3 are satisfied for both players, identify the simulation run as convergent.
These criteria simply reflect what we observe in Figure S3. While we cannot conclude that this
heuristic works in general, a direct inspection of over 100 simulation runs for several values of
N confirms that convergence to pure strategy Nash equilibria or failure to converge has been
correctly identified in the vast majority of cases.
Finally, we would like to add a word of caution on the seemingly stronger instability of
replicator dynamics as compared to other learning algorithms. Because of infinite memory and
depending on the initial condition, it might take long to “find” a pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
meaning that the replicator dynamics can hit the machine precision limits first, when it is still
in a “transient”. In other words, it may not be in the basin of attraction determined by a cycle,
but it may also have not reached a pure strategy Nash equilibrium within the confidence time
interval. This is especially the case for large payoff matrices, N ≥ 50.
15As can be seen from the straight lines in the bottom panels of Figure S3.
16We experimented with arbitrary precision numbers, using the Python package decimal. This is not very
helpful, as it takes exponentially more time for the players to switch to other moves as the simulation goes on.
Moreover, it is extremely computationally expensive, so that one simulation run with arbitrary precision numbers
can last more than 100 times than the equivalent with floating point numbers.
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Parameter values We simulate the replicator dynamics by choosing an integration step
of δt = 0.1 (small enough so to prevent overshooting of the boundaries of the probability
simplex), and a simulation time of 3000 time steps maximum. However, as discussed before,
the simulation time is typically shorter and determined by the first strategy hitting the machine
precision boundary.
S1.1.5 Experience-Weighted Attraction
Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) has been proposed by Camerer and Ho [S16] to general-
ize reinforcement and belief learning algorithms (such as fictitious play, or best reply dynamics).
The key insight is that real players use information about experienced payoffs, as in reinforce-
ment learning. But they also try and predict the next moves of their opponent, as in belief
learning. The authors report a better experimental out-of-sample goodness-of-fit than with
simple reinforcement learning or fictitious play, showing evidence in favor of their theory.
The connection between reinforcement and belief learning lies in the update of the moves
that were not played, i.e. in considering the foregone payoffs. If only the probabilities of the
moves that are played are updated, EWA reduces to a simple version of reinforcement learning
(not to the Bush-Mosteller implementation described in Section S1.1.2). If all probabilities
are updated with the same weight, EWA reduces to fictitious play or best reply dynamics,
depending on the parameters.
Finally, note that EWA also reduces to replicator dynamics by taking the limits of some
parameters (e.g., by taking the limit of infinite memory).[S17]
Formal definition In EWA, the mixed strategies are determined from the so-called attrac-
tions or propensities Qµi (t). These are real numbers that quantify the level of appreciation of
player µ for move i at time t. Attractions are not normalized, so the probability for player Row
to play move i is given by a logit,
xi(t+ 1) =
eβQ
R
i (t+1)∑
j e
βQRj (t+1)
, (S14)
where β is the payoff sensitivity or intensity of choice17 and a similar expression holds for
yj(t+ 1). The propensities update as follows:
Qµi (t+ 1) =
(1− α)N (t)Qµi (t) + (δ + (1− δ)I(i, sµ(t+ 1))Πµ(i, s−µ(t+ 1))
N (t+ 1) , (S15)
where
N (t+ 1) = (1− α)(1− κ)N (t) + 1. (S16)
Here N (t) represents experience because it increases monotonically with the number of
rounds played; the more it grows, the smaller becomes the influence of the received payoffs
on the attractions (as the denominator increases). The propensities change according to the
received payoff when playing move i against move s−µ by the other players, i.e. Πµ(i, s−µ(t+1)).
The indicator function I(i, sµ(t+1)) is equal to 1 if i is the actual move that was played by µ at
time t+ 1, that is i = sµ(t+ 1), and equal to 0 otherwise. All attractions (those corresponding
17The larger β, the more the players consider the attractions in determining their strategy. In the limit β →∞
the players choose with certainty the move with the largest attraction. In the limit β → 0 they choose randomly,
disregarding the attractions.
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to strategies that were and were not played) are updated with weight δ, while an additional
weight 1 − δ is given to the specific attraction corresponding to the move that was actually
played. Finally, the memory loss parameter α determines how quickly previous attraction and
experience are discounted and the parameter κ interpolates between cumulative and average
reinforcement learning [39].
As with the other learning algorithms, we take a deterministic limit. Under the assumption
of batch learning, Eq. (S15) reads
QRi (t+ 1) =
(1− α)N (t)QRi (t) + (δ + (1− δ)xi(t))
∑
j Π
R(i, j)yj(t)
N (t+ 1) , (S17)
and a similar expression holds for Column.
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Figure S4: Instances of simulation runs of Experience-Weighted Attraction with N = 20. Each line is a component
of the mixed strategy vector of Row (not all components are visible, as they overlap). Left panels: non-converging
simulation run. The range of the horizontal axes has been chosen to ease visualization of the dynamics. Right
panels: converging simulation run. Top panels: linear scale. Bottom panels: logarithmic scale on the vertical
axis.
Convergence criteria Consider Figure S4, right panels. All components of the EWA dy-
namical system reach a fixed point, differently from the other learning algorithms, so it is easier
to identify convergence. We run the EWA dynamics for 500 time steps and we consider the last
20% time steps to determine convergence. With the parameter values we choose for α, β, κ
and δ, the transient is usually of the order of 100 time steps, so 500 steps is enough to identify
convergence. We then check that the average variance of the logarithms of the components of
the mixed strategy vectors does not exceed a certain (very small) threshold. We look at the
logarithms because the probabilities following the EWA dynamics vary on an exponential scale
and can be of the order of, e.g., 10−100. In formula, if 1/N
∑N
i=1 5/T
∑T
t=4/5T (log xi(t))
2 > 10−2
or 1/N
∑N
j=1 5/T
∑T
t=4/5T (log yj(t))
2 > 10−2, with T = 500, we identify the simulation run as
non-convergent.
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Parameter values EWA has two main advantages from a computational point of view. First,
if the memory loss parameter is positive (α > 0), all stable attractors of the EWA system lie
within the probability simplex. This means that no moves are ever given null or unit probability
and makes it possible to reliably simulate the EWA map for arbitrarily long time, since for a
sufficiently large value of α the machine precision limits are never reached. The intuition
for this property is simple: the performance of very successful or very unsuccessful moves is
forgotten exponentially over time, so even a very small value of α prompts the players to choose
unsuccessful moves with positive probability. The second advantage is that the EWA system is
explicitly normalized every time step, making numerical errors unlikely.
EWA also has a computational disadvantage: because it uses exponential functions to map
attractions into probabilities, if the value of the payoff sensitivity β is too large, the components
of the mixed strategy vector may vary by too many orders of magnitude, and therefore overshoot
the boundaries of the mixed strategy simplex.
So care should be taken in choosing the values of α and β. This is the case also because of
an additional feature of the EWA system: with large memory loss or small payoff sensitivity,
the learning dynamics converges to the center of the strategy simplex. In the limit where β = 0
the players just choose uniformly at random between their possible moves, irrespective of the
payoff matrix. In Ref. [25] it was observed that for sufficiently large values of α/β a unique
fixed point was always stable. Such a fixed point can be arbitrarily far from mixed strategy
Nash equilibria, and so by changing their strategy the players can improve their payoff. We
are not interested in this “trivial” attractor as we want to focus on the effect of the best reply
structure of the payoff matrix on the learning dynamics. Therefore, we choose parameter values
for α and β that prevent convergence to this fixed point.
A final important technical remark is that we rescale the payoff sensitivity β by
√
N as
the payoff matrix gets larger. The reason is that the expected payoffs
∑
j Π
R(i, j)yj and∑
i Π
C(j, i)xi scale as 1/
√
N . Indeed, focusing on the expected payoff of player Row,
∑
j Π
R(i, j)
scales as
√
N due to the Central Limit Theorem (recall that the payoffs are generated randomly,
see below for the precise rule), while the components yj scale as 1/N due to the normalization
constraint. So
∑
j Π
R(i, j)yj scales as 1/
√
N . The same argument applies to the expected
payoff of player Column. Now, note that β multiplies the expected payoff from Eqs. (S14) and
(S17). Therefore, increasing the size of the payoff matrix has the same effect as decreasing β,
until the attractor at the center of the strategy simplex becomes stable again. To prevent this
from happening, we rescale β by
√
N , so that β
∑
j Π
R(i, j)yj and β
∑
i Π
C(j, i)xi do not scale
with N .
For all simulations we choose α = 0.18, β =
√
N , κ = 1 and δ = 1, which ensure that the
EWA dynamics stays within the probability simplex, that it does not overshoot the simplex
boundaries and that it does not reach the trivial attractor in the center of the simplex.
S1.1.6 Experience-Weighted Attraction with noise
So far we have assumed batch learning. Here we consider online learning, i.e. the players up-
date their mixed strategies after observing a single move by their opponent. The players choose
a move with probability given by their mixed strategy vector. We focus on EWA because of
its superior numerical properties (as compared to the other algorithms). Given that introduc-
ing noise makes identifying convergence more challenging, we choose the algorithm for which
identifying convergence has been simplest.
Formal definition EWA with noise is simply given by Eqs. (S14), (S15) and (S16). At
time t, player Row selects move i with probability xi(t) and player Column selects move j with
11
probability yj(t).
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Figure S5: Instances of simulation runs of EWA and EWA with noise with N = 20. Each line is a component of
the mixed strategy vector of Row (not all components are visible, as they overlap). Left panels: non-converging
simulation run. Right panels: converging simulation run. Top panels: deterministic approximation of EWA.
Bottom panels: EWA with noise.
Convergence criteria As can be seen in Figure S5, the deterministic approximation of EWA
and the noisy version are generally very similar. In the convergent example a move which is
not the most commonly played one (i.e. the light green line) is selected from time to time, and
this potentially pulls player Row away from equilibrium. What usually occurs instead is that
the player returns to equilibrium after a short time.
We use the following convergence heuristic:
1. Only consider the last 20% time steps.
2. Only keep the moves that have been played with a frequency larger than 1/N .
3. Find the most common value of the probabilities, i.e. the fixed point.
4. Count the occurrences in which the probabilities are farther than 0.02 from the most
common value.
5. If the occurrences are more than 10% of the considered time interval, identify the simula-
tion run as non-convergent. Otherwise, identify it as convergent.
Parameter values Differently from the case of deterministic EWA, we need to consider a
longer time interval for the dynamics to settle down to an attractor. We take 5000 iterations as
a maximum, as for Bush-Mosteller dynamics and fictitious play. The values of the parameters
are the same, except for the intensity of choice: we take β =
√
N/2. The reason why we reduce
12
the intensity of choice is that β =
√
N leads the dynamics too close to the boundaries of the
strategy simplex, and noise almost disappears. Indeed, if the dominant strategy is played with
probability e.g. xi(t) = 0.99995, deviations from equilibrium are extremely unlikely, and we
recover the deterministic case.
S1.1.7 Level-k learning
We refer to level-k learning as a generalization of anticipatory learning (proposed by Selten
[S18]). Selten assumed that player Row does not believe that Column would behave as she did
in the past. He rather tries to outsmart her by best replying to the strategy that he thinks she
will play on the following time step. Row needs a forecast of her strategy, and obtains it by
assuming that Column is an EWA learner.
This idea can be generalized by assuming that the players can think k steps ahead [S19, S20].
In level-k thinking [S21, S22] k-players assume that the other players are level k − 1, and the
process is iterated down to level 1. Level-1 players choose randomly. Level-2 players know that
level-1 players choose randomly, and select the strategy that yields the highest payoff given this
piece of information. Level-3 players know how level-2 players behave, and react accordingly,
and so on.
In our case, level-1 players are EWA learners. Level-2 players know that level-1 players
update their strategies using EWA, and try to get a better payoff by pre-empting their oppo-
nent’s move. Level-3 players would know how level-2 players choose their strategy, and select
the best possible strategy in response. Here we will assume that both players are level-2, as we
did not find a substantial difference with larger values of k (which quickly become behaviorally
implausible).
Formal definition For convenience, we combine Eqs. (S14) and (S17):
x1i (t+ 1) =
xi(t)
(1−α)N (t)/N (t+1) exp
(
β(δ + (1− δ)xi(t))
∑
j Π
R(i, j)yj(t)/N (t+ 1)
)
Zx(t+ 1)
, (S18)
with Zx(t + 1) =
∑
l xl(t)
(1−α)N (t)/N (t+1) exp
(
β(δ + (1− δ)xl(t))
∑
j Π
R(l, j)yj(t)/N (t+ 1)
)
.
We are using superscript 1 to indicate that player Row is a level-1 (i.e. an EWA) learner. A
similar expression holds for Column.
We denote the right-hand side in Eq. (S18) by F (y(t)), with y(t) = (y1(t), . . . yN (t)). So,
x1i (t+ 1) = F (y(t)). Player Row learns based on the past mixed strategy vector of Column. We
define
y2j (t+ 1) = F (x
1(t+ 1)). (S19)
Here Column is a level-2 player as she believes that Row is a level-1 player, and therefore
updates his strategies using Eq. (S18). In general,
ykj (t+ 1) = F (x
k−1(t+ 1)). (S20)
Convergence criteria The dynamics is qualitatively very similar to EWA, so we use the
same convergence criteria.
Parameter values We also use the same parameter values. Both Row and Column are level-2
players.
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S1.2 Initialization of the payoff matrices
In order to study generic payoff matrices, we sample the space of all possible payoff matrices by
generating the payoff elements at random. Following Ref. [25], at initialization we randomly
generate N2 pairs of payoffs (i.e., if Row plays i and Column plays j, a pair a, b implies that
Row gets a, Column gets b), and we keep the payoff matrix fixed for the rest of the simulation
(so the system described by the payoff matrix can be thought of as quenched). We consider an
ensemble of payoff matrices constrained by the mean, variance and correlation of the pairs. The
Maximum Entropy distribution that obeys these constraints is a bivariate Gaussian [25], which
we parametrize with zero mean, unit variance and correlation Γ. Therefore, Γ < 0 implies that
the game is competitive (zero-sum in the extreme case where Γ = −1), while Γ > 0 encourages
cooperation (see the main text). If Γ = 0 all best reply configurations are equiprobable because
the payoffs are chosen independently at random, so we shall consider this as a benchmark case
where we sample the space of all possible games with equal probability.
Fig. 2 of the main paper: We generate 1000 payoff matrices at random with Γ = 0 and
N = 20, starting from 100 random initial conditions for each payoff matrix.
Fig. 3 of the main paper, top panel: We generate 180 payoff matrices at random with
Γ = 0, starting from 10 random initial conditions for each payoff matrix, for the following
numbers of moves: N = {2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, 20, 30, 50, 100, 200, 400}. We sensibly reduce the
number of simulation runs per value of N because the random generation of the payoff matrix,
the identification of the best reply structure and the simulations of the dynamics are time
consuming for N ≥ 50.
Fig. 3 of the main paper, bottom panel: Same as top panel, but we consider correlations
Γ = {−1.0,−0.9,−0.8, . . . , 0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0} and only 50 payoff matrices for each value of Γ.
Fig. 4 of the main paper: same as Fig. 3, top panel.
S2 Supplementary numerical results
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Figure S6: Same as Fig. 2 of the main paper, but with N = 5 instead of N = 20.
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Figure S7: Same as Fig. 2 of the main paper, but with N = 50 instead of N = 20.
In this section we first perform a few robustness tests with respect to the numerical findings
in the main paper. We then present a few additional results regarding the heterogeneity of the
learning algorithms and the correlation between Boolean and non-Boolean payoff matrices.
For what concerns the robustness tests, we check whether we get the same results as in Fig.
2 of the main paper, once we consider a different number of moves N . As can be seen in Figures
S6 and S7, the overall pattern is similar, but there are some differences. We are plotting the
fraction of non-convergence of best reply dynamics, as given by the relative share of best reply
cycles F(v), on the horizontal axis. The fraction of non-converging simulation runs for the six
learning algorithms we have been considering is on the vertical axis.
For N = 5 the correlation is stronger than with N = 20, and the values of the weighted
correlation coefficient are even larger than 0.9 in non-Boolean payoff matrices. We conjecture
that this is due to a higher share of the moves that are part of cycles and fixed points. Indeed,
for N = 5 the most common best reply vector with cycles is v = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0), so the moves
that are part of the cycle are 2/5. On the other hand, in a best reply vector with a 2-cycle and
N = 20 the moves that are part of the cycle are 2/20, so the payoffs that are not best replies
have more importance and the issue of quasi-best replies is more severe.
An interesting detail is that level-k learning converges in most cases. Inspection of individual
simulation runs suggests that by anticipating the moves of their opponent, the players are less
likely to get stuck in periodic cycles and converge instead to mixed strategy equilibria.
For N = 50 we observe the opposite pattern than with N = 5: the correlation becomes
weaker (but still larger than 0.6 in most cases). This effect is most likely caused by a smaller
share of moves that are part of cycles or fixed points (the most common best reply vector is
v = (0, . . . 0, 1, 1), involving only 3/50 of the moves). Quasi-best replies probably play a more
important role. However, we cannot exclude measurement error.
In Figure S8 we show the correlation matrix of the co-occurrence of convergence of the six
learning algorithms we have considered. For each of the 1000 payoff matrices that were sampled
for N = 20, and for each learning algorithm, we calculate the frequency of non-convergence.
Therefore, we have six vectors of 1000 components, and we consider the correlation among
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Figure S8: Correlation matrix of the co-occurrence of non-convergence in any of the 1000 payoff matrices among
Bush-Mosteller (BM) learning, Fictitious Play (FP), Replicator Dynamics (RD), Experience-Weighted Attraction
(EWA), EWA with Noise (EWAN) and level-k learning (LEVELK).
them. Perfect correlation would mean that for each payoff matrix the non-convergence rate is
identical.
We find that the three most correlated algorithms are replicator dynamics, Experience-
Weighted Attraction (EWA) and level-k learning. The two least correlated algorithms are
fictitious play and EWA with noise. The correlation ranges between 0.35 and 0.85, suggesting
a relatively strong heterogeneity between the six algorithms.
Finally, in Table S1 we show the correlation between the co-occurrence of convergence in
Boolean and non-Boolean payoff matrices. As before, we consider vectors of 1000 components,
in which each component is the frequency of non-convergence in a specific payoff matrix. The
correlations are obtained from the pairwise comparison between the vectors referring to Boolean
and non-Boolean payoff matrices.
As Boolean payoff matrices are constructed to have the same best reply structure as their
non-Boolean counterpart, lack of perfect correlation is due to the details of the payoffs. Inter-
estingly, correlation is very low in the case of fictitious play, whereas it is relatively high with
replicator dynamics and EWA.
BM FP RD EWA EWAN LEVELK mean
0.49 0.35 0.65 0.61 0.46 0.52 0.51
Table S1: Correlation between the co-occurrence of non-convergence in Boolean and non-Boolean payoff matrices,
for the six learning algorithms we have considered.
S3 Details of the analytical calculations
First, we provide a thorough derivation of the expression for the frequency of best reply vectors,
and use it on some examples. Second, we obtain additional expressions that quantify the fraction
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of payoff matrices with at least one cycle of any given length (including fixed points, which are
cycles of length one), and use these equations to find the share of payoff matrices with no fixed
points or at least one cycle. Third, we derive asymptotic estimates for the frequency of cycles
and fixed points in infinite dimensional payoff matrices.
S3.1 Frequency of best reply vectors
We first discuss the count of the ways to form k-cycles and fixed points of best reply dynamics,
and then we count the ways to place the free best replies (i.e. those that are not part of either
cycles or fixed points). Finally we show how we combine these numbers together to obtain the
count of best reply configurations that correspond to a specific set of attractors.
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Figure S9: All possible 3! 2! = 12 ways to combine 3 moves per player to form 3-cycles. The color code has been
kept consistent with the main text. The (1,2,3) vertical arrays contain the labels of the moves and the arrows
represent the best replies. A cycle is a closed loop of best replies. These 12 combinations are also all best reply
configurations featuring a 3-cycle in payoff matrices with N = 3. Using Eq. (S21), f(3, 3) = 12.
We start the count of k-cycles by example. In Fig. S9 we exhaustively report all possible
ways to form 3-cycles in a payoff matrix with N = 3. The vertical (1, 2, 3) arrays and the arrows
that connect the labels of the moves illustrate the main intuition: we find all possible best reply
sequences that form a closed loop. We arbitrarily start at sR = 1 (because this is a cycle, the
starting point does not matter), we look at the best reply by player Column, sC ∈ {1, 2, 3},
and we connect sR = 1 with sC . In the top left panel, we connect sR = 1 to sC = 3. The first
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choice can be done in k = 3 ways. Once we have determined the first best reply by Column,
we continue constructing the cycle by choosing a second best reply by Row. The second choice
can only be done in k − 1 = 2 ways. In the top left panel, we connect sC = 3 to sR = 2. We
then select a second best reply by Column. Again, we have k − 1 = 2 possibilities. In the top
left panel, we connect sR = 2 to sC = 2. The third and last best replies for Row and Column
are constrained, there is only one (k − 2 = 1) way to choose the remaining BR. In the top left
panel, we connect sC = 2 to sR = 3 and sR = 3 to sC = 1. We have 3 · 2 · 2 · 1 · 1 = 12 ways
to form 3-cycles with n = 3 available moves. Recall that n denotes the number of moves per
player which are not already part of cycles or fixed points. In general n might be smaller than
N , but in Fig. S9 all moves are part of the cycle, so N = n = k = 3.
It is possible to generalize this argument and to conclude that there are k!(k − 1)! ways to
form k-cycles, once we determine which moves of players Row and Column are involved. Any
k moves out of n can be chosen (by both players), so there are
(
n
k
)2
possibilities. We define
f(n, k) =
(
n
k
)2
k!(k − 1)!, (S21)
with 2 ≤ k ≤ n, as the count of the ways to have a k-cycle with n available moves per player.
In the above example, f(3, 3) = 12.
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Figure S10: All possible 3! = 6 ways to combine 3 moves per player to form 3 fixed points. The color code has
been kept consistent with the main text. Note that these are also all best reply configurations featuring 3 fixed
points in payoff matrices with N = 3. Using Eq. (S21), f(3, 1) f(2,1)
2
f(1,1)
3
= 9 4
2
1
3
= 6.
We now look at the ways to form fixed points, and we begin again by example. In Fig.
S10 we report all possible ways to form 3 fixed points in a payoff matrix with N = 3. Once
we determine which moves are part of the fixed points (all, in this case), we form all possible
combinations of fixed points by picking pairs of moves from the lists of available moves by both
players. For convenience, we start again from sR = 1. We form a fixed point by choosing any
move sC ∈ {1, 2, 3}, so that (sR, sC) is a fixed point. In the left panel, we choose (1,1) as the
first fixed point. We then consider sR = 2. There are only two moves available from player
Column to form a second fixed point. In the left panel, (2,2) is the second fixed point. Finally,
for sR = 3 only one move by Column is available. By process of elimination, in the left panel
(3,3) is the third and last fixed point.
This example illustrates that the computation of the number of fixed points is very similar
to the case of cycles, and indeed fixed points are just cycles of length one. In order to get
the number of ways to form fixed points, we can apply Eq. (S21) iteratively and consider the
double, triple etc. counting of fixed points. We get
n1∏
j=1
f(n+ 1− j, 1)
j
(S22)
as the count of the ways to have n1 fixed points with n available moves per player. In the above
example, f(3, 1)f(3,2)2
f(3,3)
3 = 9
4
2
1
3 = 6.
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Figure S11: All possible 32 − 1 = 8 ways to choose the two remaining best replies, so that they do not form a
fixed point at (3, 3). The color code has been kept consistent with the main text. Using Eq. (S23), g3(1, 0) = 8.
We finally calculate the ways to place the free best replies, which are not part of either
cycles or fixed points. We begin again by example. In Fig. S11 we show payoff matrices with
one free best reply per player. In the top left panel, the best reply of Row to Column playing
sC = 3 is sR = 2; the best reply of Column to Row playing sR = 3 is sC = 3. The free best
replies can be chosen freely, except for both of them to be move 3, in which case they would
form another fixed point. In this example there are 32 − 1 = 8 ways to choose free best replies
so that they do not form other cycles or fixed points.
In general,
gN (n, d) = N
2n −
n∑
k=1
f(n, k)gN (n− k, d+ 1)/(d+ 1) (S23)
counts all possible ways to combine n free best replies in a N×N payoff matrix, so that they do
not form other cycles or fixed points. We provide a more complete example for Eq. (S23) at the
end of this section. Note that N is a parameter and therefore is indicated as a subscript, while
n is a recursion variable: even when the number of available moves n is smaller than N , the
free best replies can be chosen out of all the N moves (see Fig. S11), in N2n ways. The second
term counts the “forbidden” combinations, i.e. the ones that form cycles or fixed points. This
term has a recursive structure. It counts the number of ways to form each type of attractor,
and then the number of ways not to have other attractors. d denotes the recursion depth. The
division by d+ 1 is needed to prevent double, triple, etc. counting of attractors.
We now combine all the ways to have cycles, fixed points and free best replies to calculate
the number of best reply configurations that correspond to a generic best reply vector v =
(nN , nN−1, ...nk, ...n2, n1). We denote by n1 the number of fixed points and by nk, with 2 ≤
k ≤ N , the number of k-cycles. Of course v has to obey the obvious constraint that fixed points
and k-cycles do not take up more than N moves:
∑N
k=1 nkk ≤ N . The frequency of the best
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Figure S12: Payoff matrix with N = 11. The color code has been kept consistent with the main text. The set
of attractors of best reply dynamics in the payoff matrix is v = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 2), with n3 = 1, n2 = 2,
n1 = 2 and nk = 0, if k > 3. It is
∑11
k=1 nkk = 9 < 11.
reply vector v is
ρ(v) =
 N∏
k=1
nk∏
j=1
f
(
N −∑Nl=k+1 nll − (j − 1)k, k)
j
 gN (N − N∑
l=2
nll − n1, 0
)/(
N2N
)
.
(S24)
Eq. (S24) is Eq. (3) in the main paper. The first term with f counts all the ways to have
k-cycles, by multiplying the counts for all values of k (first product) and for all k-cycles for a
specific value of k (second product). Note that we progressively reduce the number of moves
available to form k-cycles, as more and more moves become part of k-cycles (see below for an
example that clarifies this point). If there are multiple k-cycles, nk > 1, we divide the count
by j = 1, ...nk so to avoid double, triple, etc. counting. The case k = 1 accounts for fixed
points. The second term gN counts all the ways to choose the remaining N −
∑N
l=2 nll−n1 free
best replies. The product of the three terms gives the number of best reply configurations that
correspond to the best reply vector v. We divide this number by the possible configurations
N2N and we obtain the frequency ρ(v).
As an example, we calculate the number of best reply configurations with the same set of
attractors as in Fig. S12. We start counting the ways to form 3-cycles. We can choose any 3
moves out of 11 for both players to be part of a 3-cycle, meaning that there are
(
11
3
)2
possibilities.
Once we have selected 3 moves per player, we can obtain 12 cycles for each choice by choosing
3!2! = 12 sequences of moves. So the number of ways to form 3-cycles is f(11, 3). The same
reasoning applies to the two 2-cycles, except that there are only 8 and 6 moves per player still
available and that the count of the ways to have 2-cycles needs to be divided by 2 in order to
avoid double counting. So we multiply f(11, 3) by f(8, 2)f(6, 2)/2. The number of best reply
configurations with 2 fixed points in the remaining 4 moves can be calculated similarly: each
player can choose the first fixed point out of 4 moves, and the second out of 3, but we have to
consider double counting. So f(4, 1)f(3, 1)/2 gives the ways to form the two fixed points out of
the 4 remaining moves. We are left with 2 moves per player that are not part of cycles or fixed
points. There are 114 ways to choose the free best replies, but we have to exclude the cases
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in which they would form another 2-cycle or one or more fixed points. There are 2 ways they
could form a 2-cycle (f(2, 2)), and 4 ways they could form 1 fixed point (f(2, 1)). But for each
of the latter we have to consider all compatible configurations, i.e. calculate g11(1, 1): there are
112 ways to choose the free best replies, minus the way in which this choice would form another
fixed point (divided by 2, to account for the situation with two fixed points). In summary, the
number of best reply configurations is given by
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 2) = f(11, 3)f(8, 2)
f(6, 2)
2
f(4, 1)
f(3, 1)
2
g11(2, 0)/(11
22), (S25)
with f(11, 3) =
(
11
3
)2
3 · 2 · 2, f(8, 2) = (82)22, f(6, 2) = (62)22, f(4, 1) = (41)21, f(3, 1) = (31)21
and g11(2, 0) = 11
4 − 2− 4 · g11(1, 1), with g11(1, 1) = 112 − 1/2.
The explicit computation of the frequency gives ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 2) = 1.44 · 10−6, so
the best reply vector in Fig. S12 is very infrequent. For N = 11, the most common best reply
vectors are:
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) = 0.17,
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2) = 0.14,
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) = 0.14,
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) = 0.13,
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) = 0.09.
(S26)
For N = 20, the most common best reply vectors are:
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) = 0.10,
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) = 0.10,
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2) = 0.09,
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) = 0.09,
ρ(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) = 0.07.
(S27)
We observe that k-cycles with high values of k are never really frequent; the frequency of any
specific best reply vector decreases with N (because there are many more best reply vectors with
positive frequency); the best reply vectors with cycles become more frequent as N increases,
consistently with Fig. 4 of the main paper. Note that an accurate numerical estimate of the
most common best reply vectors might be challenging due to the extremely high number of best
reply configurations: the analytical result makes it possible to obtain exact estimates.
S3.2 Frequency of cycles and fixed points
So far we have provided an analytical expression to calculate the frequency of a specific best
reply vector. In this section we obtain equations for the frequency of payoff matrices with at
least one fixed point or one cycle of any specific length, and then for the frequency of payoff
matrices with at least one cycle of any length. These expressions are useful because it is
computationally very expensive to calculate the frequency of all best reply vectors and then
consider the ensemble average. Indeed, in Fig. 4 of the main paper the analytical line with
the frequency of non-convergence under best reply dynamics (middle green line, FN ) stops at
N = 50. On the contrary, the analytical lines for the fraction of payoff matrices with at least one
cycle (top blue line, F(v) > 0) and with no fixed points (bottom red line, F(v) = 1) continue
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up to N = 400. This is due to the fact that to compute the middle line we need to explicitly
calculate the frequency of all best reply vectors, whereas to compute the top and bottom lines
we use the expressions derived in this section.
Define
hN (n, k, d) = f(n, k)
[
N2(n−k) − hN (n− k, k, d+ 1)
d+ 2
]
. (S28)
hN counts the number of configurations with at least one k-cycle in a N ×N payoff matrix,
with n moves that are not already part of other k-cycles, at recursion depth d. The reasoning
is similar to that in the previous section. Consider for instance the calculation of the number
of 2-cycles in a 4× 4 payoff matrix: N = n = 4, k = 2, d = 0. By using Eq. (S28), h4(4, 2, 0) =
f(4, 2)
[
42·2 − h4(2, 2, 1)/2
]
, where h4(2, 2, 1) = f(2, 2)
[
40
]
= 2. There is a number f(4, 2) of
2-cycles, and for each of these there are 44 ways to place the two remaining best replies of the
players. But if those are combined so that they form another 2-cycle, we would count 2-cycles
twice, so we need to remove one best reply configuration from the count.
We use the shorthand
ρ(N, k) =
hN (N, k, 0)
N2N
(S29)
for the fraction of N ×N payoff matrices with at least one k-cycle. Because a fixed point is a
cycle of length one, Eq. (S29) can be used to calculate the number of payoff matrices with at
least one fixed point, and
ρN (n1 = 0) = 1− h(N, 1)
N2N
(S30)
is the fraction of payoff matrices with no fixed points. Eq. (S30) has been used for the bottom
red analytical line in Fig. 4 of the main paper. Best reply dynamics never converges to a
fixed point in these games, and other learning algorithms are very unlikely to converge as well
(consider Fig. 2 in the main paper). Therefore, ρN (n1 = 0) is a lower bound for the frequency
of non-convergence in generic games with N moves.
Now define
h′N (n, d) =
n∑
k=2
f(n, k)
[
N2(n−k) − hN (n− k, k, d+ 1)
d+ 2
]
. (S31)
This expression is analogous to Eq. (S28), but it considers k-cycles of any length (except k = 1),
as opposed to k-cycles of a specific length. Indeed, we sum over all possible values of k, and the
term with the double counting also considers cycles of any length. The fraction of configurations
with at least one cycle is
ρN
(
N∑
k=2
nk > 0
)
=
h′N (N, 0)
N2N
, (S32)
and this expression has been used for the top blue analytical line in Fig. 4 of the main paper.
It represents an upper bound for the frequency of non-convergence in generic games with N
moves, because the lack of best reply cycles implies convergence in most cases.
Note that
∑N
k=2 ρ(N, k) sums to more than N
2N , because several best reply configurations
have multiple cycles of different length. On the contrary, h′N (N, 0) is always less than N
2N ,
because some configurations have cycles but no fixed points. Had we started the summation in
Eq. (S31) from k = 1, the count would sum exactly to N2N , because all configurations have at
least one cycle or one fixed point.
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S3.3 Asymptotic frequency of attractors
Eq. (S28) can be used, in the limit N →∞, to calculate analytically the absolute and relative
frequencies of payoff matrices with at least one k-cycle or fixed point. Note that this calculation
could potentially be related to the recently proposed concept of graphons [S23], namely graphs
of infinite size. We make the following ansatz:
lim
N→∞
hN (N, k, 0)
N2N
≈ hN (N − k, k, 1)
(N − k)2(N−k) . (S33)
We are making two approximations whose validity will be verified ex-post. First, the frequency
of k-cycles reaches a fixed point as N → ∞. Second, the functional form of hN (n, k, 0) is very
similar to that of hN (n, k, 1). We know that this is not the case, as the term used to avoid
multiple counting – namely hN (n − k, k, d + 1) – is divided by 2 for d = 0 and by 3 for d = 1.
The approximation becomes exact only for d→∞ (because 1/d and 1/(d+1) are very similar),
but the quantity we are interested into has d = 0.
We can write
hN (N, k, 0)
N2N
=
N2(N − 1)2...(N − k + 1)2
(k!)2
k!(k − 1)!
[
N2(N−k) − hN (N−k,k,1)2
]
N2N
. (S34)
By applying the ansatz in Eq. (S33) and after some algebra we obtain
lim
N→∞
hN (N, k, 0)
N2N
:= ρ(k) =
1
(k!)2
k!(k − 1)! (1− ρ(k)/2) , (S35)
which can be solved self-consistently to yield
ρ(k) =
2
2k + 1
. (S36)
So for N →∞, fixed points appear in 2/3 of the payoff matrices, 2-cycles appear in 2/5 of the
payoff matrices, 3-cycles in 2/7, 4-cycles in 2/9, etc. Eq. (S36) has been used to calculate the
asymptotic frequency of configurations with no fixed points (1/3) in Fig. 4 of the main paper.
We can easily obtain the relative frequencies (with respect to fixed points):
ρ(k)
ρ(1)
=
3
2k + 1
, (S37)
so 2-cycles appear 3/5 as often as fixed points, 3-cycles appear 3/7 as often, 4-cycles 3/9 as
often, 5-cycles 3/11 as often, etc.
In Fig. S13 we report the frequency of k-cycles, as calculated using Eq. (S34), as a function
of the number of available moves N . There is a good correspondence between the asymptotic
behavior in Eq. (S36) and the explicit computation up to N = 400, at least for the smallest
values of k (excluding the fixed points).
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Figure S13: Frequency of k-cycles, ρ(N, k), as a function of the number of moves N . The numbers annotated on
the right are the asymptotic frequencies of k-cycles, as calculated using Eq. (S36). The approximations tend to
slightly overestimate the frequency, at least up to N = 400, even more so for larger values of k. The exception is
the fixed points, in which the approximation tends to be worse.
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